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Abstract—Many types of robotic vehicles are increasingly 
utilized in both civilian and military maritime missions. Some 
amount of human supervision is typically present in such 
operations, thereby ensuring appropriate accountability in case 
of mission accidents or errors. However, there is growing interest 
in augmenting the degree of independence of such vehicles, up to 
and including full autonomy. A primary challenge in the face of 
reduced operator oversight is to maintain full human 
responsibility for ethical robot behavior. 
Informed by decades of direct involvement in both naval 
operations and unmanned systems research, this work proposes a 
new mathematical formalism that maintains human 
accountability at every level of robot mission planning and 
execution. This formalism is based on extending a fully general 
model for digital computation, known as a Turing machine. This 
extension, called a Mission Execution Automaton (MEA), allows 
communication with one or more “external agents” that interact 
with the physical world and respond to queries/commands from 
the MEA while observing human-defined ethical constraints. 
An important MEA feature is that it is language independent 
and results in mission definitions equally well suited to human or 
robot execution (or any arbitrary combination).  Formal 
description logics are used to enforce mission structure and 
semantics, provide operator assurance of correct mission 
definition, and ensure suitability of a mission definition for 
execution by a specific vehicle, all prior to mission parsing and 
execution. Computer simulation examples show the value of such 
a Mission Execution Ontology (MEO). 
The flexibility of the MEA formalism is illustrated by 
application to a prototypical multiphase area search and sample 
mission. This paper presents an entirely new approach to 
achieving a practical and fully testable means for ethical mission 
definition and execution. This work demonstrates that ensuring 
ethical behavior during mission execution is achievable with 
current technologies and without requiring artificial intelligence 
abstractions for high-level mission definition or control. 
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Many experts and practitioners have worked long and hard 
towards achieving functionally capable robots. Unfortunately, 
progress in ethical control of unmanned systems has been 
elusive and problematic.  Common paradigms that assume an 
always-amoral robot or that require undemonstrated morality-
based artificial intelligence (AI) are equally untenable. For 
better or worse, actors around the world are rapidly designing 
and deploying mobile unmanned systems to augment human 
capabilities.  Thus theory must meet practice. 
This paper adapts policies and procedures for ethical 
responsibility and authority that have been proven to work 
effectively in collaborative military operations. Since ethical 
responsibility is not limited to military weapons but can also 
apply to even routine task completion, this approach appears to 
have broad usefulness for civil application of unmanned 
systems as well. 
The authors’ experience across four decades of robotic and 
military operations has demonstrated that robot mission tasks 
and goals can be clearly defined and refined with 
corresponding degrees of internal control supervision. Adding 
well-specified constraints can supplement mission orders, 
providing an ethical basis for unmanned system tasking that 
matches human understanding of similar responsibilities. 
Careful structuring of mission orders in the form of a 
mathematical construct called a Mission Execution Automaton 
(MEA) demonstrates a theoretically sound and scalable basis to 
this approach. Further, a Mission Execution Ontology based on 
principles of description logics provides mathematical 
assurances that mission definitions are semantically complete, 
including ethical constraints whenever appropriate. 
The advent of digital computing, the emergence of AI, and 
the incorporation of both into a variety of robotic devices have 
brought ethical concerns to the forefront of debate.  It has 
become quite apparent that legal and moral responsibility 
cannot be addressed by a set of fixed “laws” intended to 
constrain robot behavior.  Reasoning about abstract situations 
from high-level principles [1] is beyond current capabilities to 
describe (much less arbitrate), and such essential imperatives 
cannot be regulated into irrelevance. Nevertheless, a number of 
important observations inform this work: 
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• Robots do what programmers and operators tell them to 
do—not what programmers and operators mean to tell 
them to do. 
• Apparent intelligence notwithstanding, a robot is an 
inanimate object and cannot assume moral or legal 
responsibility for an action’s consequences. 
• For robot ethics to bear any tangible meaning, ultimate 
accountability must reside with the human 
programmers, manufacturers, and operators. 
• Legal and moral liability requires that involved parties 
are in a position to reasonably foresee the outcomes for 
which they are being held responsible. 
These observations are fairly widely accepted, but 
nevertheless can still lead ethicists to different conclusions.  In 
debating military use of autonomous systems, for instance, Rob 
Sparrow of the International Committee for Robot Arms 
Control applies Jus en Bello requirements to argue that the 
military use of lethal robots is inherently unethical because 
robots cannot be held accountable for their actions [2].  Ronald 
Arkin, on the other hand, accepts the premises of Sparrow’s 
argument but comes to the opposite conclusion—that if an 
autonomous system is capable of making a lethal decision 
more reliably than a human, then it is inherently unethical to 
not use that system [3].  This work demonstrates that such 
observations can inform a broader framework for ethical 
operation of intelligent robots, one that is realizable with 
current technologies and guided by human ethical decision 
making, without any requirement for black-box artificial 
intelligence that inevitably leads to second-guessing. 
II. MILITARY OPERATIONS AS AN ANALOGY 
Authority and responsibility in military operations provide 
a useful analogy.  Military commanders are provided forces 
over which they exercise control, are assigned missions that 
they are expected to accomplish, and are held responsible for 
the proper employment of all assigned assets.  More recently, 
militaries have relied on increasingly automated systems, 
however, automation does not obviate the commander’s 
responsibility.  Ultimately, it does not matter whether a 
military leader is employing a system of people or a system of 
machines: authority implies responsibility [4]. 
Accountability in military operations requires a level of 
trust that is based on a number of important factors.  First, 
subordinate units must be qualified for the designated task 
requirements.  Second, mission orders must be unambiguous 
and fully understood by tasked units.  Finally, subordinate units 
must accurately assess task progress during execution.  This 
trust relationship provides assurance that properly employed 
subordinates do not impose undue risk.  Improperly employed 
subordinates, on the other hand, do impose undue risk for 
which the commander is rightfully held responsible. 
A variation of this ethical mechanism can be applied to 
robots in both military and civilian applications as a corollary 
to the well-established legal principle of vicarious liability [5].  
That is, operators of autonomous and unmanned systems can 
be held responsible for undesirable outcomes that they are in a 
position to prevent. 
All robots possess a finite set of operational and sensory 
capabilities, the complexity of which varies from robot to 
robot.  It is reasonable, then, to trust a robot to execute those 
atomic capabilities.  It follows that an operator can assume 
moral and legal liability for missions comprised of these 
trusted capabilities [6].  For this framework to be practically 
feasible, robot operators must be provided adequate mission 
assurance and understanding to assume responsibility.  This 
can be achieved by meeting three requirements: 
• Robot missions must be defined in a mathematically 
sound manner that ensures that the mission will 
progress as intended in all circumstances.  
• There must be no means by which an approved mission 
can be semantically modified between approval and 
execution by the target vehicle. 
• Mission tasking and associated constraints must be 
comprised entirely of trusted atomic vehicle-specific 
behaviors, and the vehicle must be able to continually 
evaluate both behavior and constraint status at run time. 
III. MISSION DEFINITION AS GOALS WITH RUN-TIME 
CONSTRAINTS 
In describing complex tasks, humans often divide them into 
series of subordinate tasks to be executed in order.  For 
instance, a complex task during which a manned vehicle is to 
conduct searches and collect environmental samples before 
rendezvousing with another vehicle might be specified as 
depicted in Fig. 1. Providing the vehicle’s operator understands 
the individual subtasks, the mission can be reliably executed. 
The vehicle operator implicitly relies on a discrete decision 
process to periodically take stock of the situation, determine 
the current task’s status, and proceed to the next task when 
appropriate.  This decision process is commonly referred to as 
an Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop when referring to 
military and other human operations, or as a Sense-Decide-Act 
(SDA) loop when referring to autonomous agent activities [7] 
[8]. 
One aspect of the above mission must be accounted for, 
however, to support execution by an autonomous agent:  the 
implicit assumption of success for each task.  When facing task 
failure, a human is able to use best judgement or request 
guidance from higher authority.  This is not necessarily an 
option for autonomous agents.  Rather, the appropriate course 
of action must be included in the mission description.  This can 
be achieved by specifying subsequent alternative tasks that 
execute in the event of any particular mission task’s success or 
failure. 
Branching based on task success or failure results in 
missions whose execution is characterized by a sequence of 
successful and unsuccessful task executions.  It is appropriate, 
then, to refer to the individual tasks as goals to be achieved 
rather than simply as tasks.  A possible modification of the 
mission from Fig. 1 is provided in Fig. 2.  Interestingly, the 
SDA/OODA decision loop is still suitable for execution control 
of this revised mission. 
Fig. 2 gives rise to a graphical representation of the natural-
language mission definition.  The flow graph of Fig. 3 is one 
among many potential representational forms for this and many 
other missions.  It is of particular interest because it provides 
an intuitive depiction of a potentially complex mission.  In fact, 
this mission specification can be used to mentally “rehearse” 
the mission by intentionally traversing the graph from start to 
finish while testing success and failure branches at every step.  
While not yet providing mathematical rigor, this ability to 
informally traverse task sequences is an important step towards 
providing assurance to the responsible operator that the 
mission will progress according to human intent.  
As presented so far, this mission definition paradigm does 
not explicitly address the issue of ethical mission execution.  
Specifically, no mechanism has been suggested at this stage to 
define ethical constraints affecting the overall mission or 
individual tasks.  For instance, it is apparent that an unmanned 
underwater vehicle (UUV) with an appropriate search behavior 
can achieve goals 1 and 3 of the example mission.  
Unfortunately, it may or may not be able to do so while 
avoiding detection, remaining clear of other vehicles, or 
maintaining a specific navigational accuracy.  If any of these or 
any other ethical constraints are to be applied to the mission, 
then they must be incorporated into the mission specification.  
Further, from the standpoint of operator accountability, 
constraints must be specified in a manner that preserves the 
ability to trace high-level mission flow and in a way that is 
enforceable by the target vehicle. 
An operator may determine that certain constraints must be 
enforced from launch until recovery (e.g., all safety systems 
must remain operational), while others only need to be 
enforced during the execution of specific goals (e.g., 
maintaining safety depth in the search area).  As an example, 
mission- and goal-level constraints might be applied to the 
example UUV mission as depicted in Fig. 4.  This construct 
still supports the prior rehearsal of missions and also allows for 
the in situ consideration of whole-mission and goal-specific 
constraints [9]. 
Under the binary branching model of Fig. 3, an impending 
ethical constraint violation implicitly equates to goal failure.  
This might be acceptable, but it might be desirable to treat 
impending constraint violations differently than simple failure.  
A third potential goal-execution outcome and a corresponding 
branching option in the mission flow structure might be useful.  
That is, execution of an individual goal terminates upon goal 
success, goal failure, or impending violation of a constraint 
applied to that goal.  A modification of the example mission to 
implement this ternary branching model is graphically depicted 
in Fig. 5. 
The flow graph mission specification described here is 
declarative.  At this level of abstraction, individual goals 
execute sequentially according to the mission graph 
irrespective of time, and each goal predictably terminates in 
one of three possible states.  This approach eliminates any need 
to make assumptions or guesses concerning intended vehicle 
Fig. 3. Mission-flow graph for search and sample mission,
human or autonomous agent execution [19]. 
Fig. 1. Example mission orders expressed in structured natural language for
human execution. 
Task 1: Proceed to Area A and search the area. 
Task 2: Obtain an environmental sample from Area A. 
Task 3: Proceed to Area B and search the area. 
Task 4: Proceed to Area C and rendezvous with vehicle 2. 
Task 5: Proceed to recovery position (mission complete). 
Fig. 2. Modified search and sample mission providing success-failure
branching and human or autonomous agent execution [17]. 
Goal 1: Proceed to Area A and search the area.  If the 
search is successful, execute Goal 2.  If the search 
is unsuccessful, execute Goal 3. 
Goal 2: Obtain an environment sample from Area A.  If 
the sample is obtained, execute Goal 3.  If the 
sample cannot be obtained, execute Goal 5. 
Goal 3: Proceed to Area B and search the area.  Upon 
either search success or failure, execute Goal 4. 
Goal 4: Proceed to Area C and rendezvous with vehicle 2.  
Upon rendezvous success or failure, execute Goal 
5. 
Goal 5: Proceed to recovery position (mission complete).  
Upon successful arrival, mission complete.  If 
unable to return to base, abort the mission. 
conduct during goal execution.  Rather, the onus is placed on 
human operators to create well-defined and thorough missions.  
Further, if the size of the mission-flow diagram is reasonably 
managed, then exhaustive testing of all possible mission 
execution sequences is achievable and tractable. 
IV. MISSION EXECUTION AUTOMATA (MEA): EXECUTABLE 
MISSION SPECIFICATIONS 
A. The Rational Behavior Model (RBM) Robot Control 
Architecture 
Flow-diagram expression of autonomous vehicle missions 
is particularly compatible with the highest level of abstraction 
for a number of proposed hierarchical robot control 
architectures [10] [11] [12] and has been utilized extensively 
with the Rational Behavior Model (RBM) [13].  RBM 
organizes robot control requirements into strategic, tactical, 
and execution levels.  The strategic level controls high-level 
mission flow, accomplishing high-level tasks by issuing 
commands to the tactical level.  The tactical level executes 
self-contained behaviors in response to strategic-level 
commands, notifying the strategic level of command outcomes 
(success, failure, or constraint violation).  The execution level 
provides real-time control of actuators and sensors as directed 
by the tactical level.  Evidently, the strategic level is well 
suited to execute mission-flow diagrams, and tactical-level 
behaviors can be comprised of atomic capabilities of a 
particular target vehicle. 
If properly encoded, the strategic-level mission-flow 
diagram forms an executable mission specification.  This 
human-and-machine compatible form is in line with ethical 
framework requirements and provides for human-based testing 
of mission code prior to robot execution.  Further, from the 
perspective of the strategic level, it does not matter whether the 
tactical level behavior is executed by an actual robot, a 
computational model, or a human being, making full-fidelity 
mission-flow-diagram rehearsal possible. 
B. Mission Execution Automaton (MEA) Definition 
Mathematical rigor of strategic-level execution steps is 
obtained by observing that the run-time traversal of the 
mission-flow diagram is similar to the operation of a 
mathematical formalism called a Turing Machine (TM) [14].  
TMs have a number of fundamental properties that are 
particularly important in the field of computer science [14] [15] 
but are generally considered impractical for real-world 
utilization [16].  They do, however, provide a strong theoretical 
foundation upon which to build a mathematically sound 
strategic-level mission-flow diagram execution mechanism 
suitable for both robots and human operators.  With some 
modification, TM execution mechanics can provide an 
execution engine for mission-flow diagrams expressed as finite 
state machines (FSM) [14] [15].  More specifically, the 
mission-flow diagrams can be viewed as robot programs that 
are executable using TM semantics.  Relaxation of some 
additional TM formalisms yields a mathematical construct that 
subsumes the more constrained TM [16].  This TM 
generalization is referred to here as a Mission Execution 
Automaton (MEA) which consists of a Mission Execution 
Engine (MEE) and an arbitrary set of mission orders in FSM 
form, and a communication link to at least one human or robot 
external agent capable of carrying out orders from a given 
finite set (as issued by the MEE) and returning results from 
another finite set [17] [18]. 
C. Strategic-Level Mission Rehearsal and Testing 
MEA implementations were initially developed in Lisp and 
Prolog [19] [16] [18].  The declarative nature of Prolog in 
Fig. 5.   Mission-flow graph for a search and sample mission with ternary 
branching for handling imminent ethical-constraint violations. 
Fig. 4.  Constraints suitable for application to the example search and sample
mission. 
Constraint 1: The vehicle must maintain navigational 
accuracy within acceptable limits.  Applies to 
entire mission. 
Constraint 2: All safety equipment must be fully 
functional.  Applies to entire mission. 
Constraint 3: All mission systems must be operational.  
Applies to Goal 1, Goal 2, and Goal 3. 
Constraint 4: Acceptable distance from shipping lanes in 
the form of 1000 meter lateral standoff or 
minimum depth of 20 meters must be 
maintained.  Applies to Goal 1, Goal 2, Goal 
3, and Goal 4. 
Constraint 5: Must be able to detect surface contacts 
within 5000 meters.  Applies to entire 
mission. 
Constraint 6: Detected surface contacts are to be avoided 
by a minimum of 1000 meters.  Applies to 
Goal 1, Goal 2, Goal 3, and Goal 4. 
Constraint 7: Minimum depth of 20 meters is to be 
maintained.  Applies to Goal 5. 
particular aligns well with the mission-flow diagram and 
makes Prolog mission orders intuitively understandable by 
non-programmers.  Strengths notwithstanding, it is important 
to note that there is nothing inherently unique about Prolog, 
and the MEE and mission orders can be accurately created with 
any Turing-complete computer language [20] [9] [21]. 
A similarly capable, independent implementation uses the 
Hierarchical Task Network (HTN) behavior model and Python 
programming language in the Combined Arms Analysis Tool 
for the 21st Century (COMBATXXI), a simulation tool 
developed and used by the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps 
within various analytic studies [22] [23].  Like the earlier 
Prolog simulation, the COMBATXXI simulation allows testing 
of the Strategic Level mission flow by a human operator, with 
typical results depicted in Fig. 6.  In the simulation, the 
Strategic Level orders commencement of individual goals and 
the human operator reports success, failure, or constraint-based 
termination of each goal.  The depicted traces in Fig. 6 
correspond to instances where each goal terminates due to 
potential constraint violation and where each goal completes 
successfully. 
This ability to formally test a mission definition by 
allowing a human operator to assume the role of the tactical 
level provides assurances that the branching upon individual 
goal success and failure matches the operator’s intent.  The 
previously discussed premise that ethical operation requires 
formal assurance that the mission will proceed as intended in 
all circumstances is thus satisfied so long as mission-flow 
graph size and structure is constrained so that it is exhaustively 
testable. 
Based on this experience it is reasonable to conclude that 
flow graphs represent a higher level of abstraction for mission 
specification than any unconstrained text-based coding 
language. Moreover, advances in graphical coding [24] may 
eventually allow non-programmers to completely specify robot 
missions by constructing a flow graph such as Fig. 5 directly 
on a computer screen. Such advances can further enhance the 
comprehension, supervision and accountability of mission 
experts for producing legally valid mission definitions. 
D. Progressive Refinement of Complex Mission Tasks 
Referring to Fig. 5, it is apparent that Goal 1 is achievable 
only if the person or software at the tactical level has 
considerable knowledge about Area A and how to search it. 
Stated differently, it can be completed only if a tactical-level 
behavior can be invoked that will execute the search 
appropriately.  To make this concrete, suppose that Area A 
contains hazards that are potentially harmful to (or impassible 
by) the search vehicle and that no current map of the area of 
interest is available. A classic algorithm for exploring for such 
circumstances is depth first search [25]. Such a search first 
discretizes the search area into a finite set of cells and proceeds 
by systematically moving the vehicle between cells.  At each 
step, the search tests the currently occupied cell to see if the 
search object is there (success).  If it is not, the search proceeds 
by moving the vehicle into a previously unexplored, adjacent 
cell. If no such cell exists, then the vehicle retreats to the 
previous cell and the process continues.  If the vehicle finds 
itself at the starting location with no adjacent unexplored cells, 
then the search is complete (failure). 
Fig. 7 depicts a flow graph for the above-described process, 
and further represents a refinement of Goal 1 of Fig. 5. If 
trusted vehicle behaviors corresponding to each of the figure’s 
goals exist, they might be commanded by a human operator 
acting on behalf of the tactical level (example available in 
[18]).  Alternatively, this depiction may be understood as a 
tactical level implementation capable of autonomous execution 
of Goal 1.  Note that all applicable constraints must be 
continuously observed throughout execution. 
Fig. 6.  Human interaction with a Strategic Level mission results obtained from the COMBAT XXI simulation. 
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This task decomposition raises an important 
implementation question: does Fig. 7 accurately represent the 
semantics of the desired behavior? Interestingly, since the flow 
diagram contains several decision loops, answering that 
particular question cannot be confirmed by exhaustive testing 
as was possible for the strategic-level mission orders.  Such test 
limitations occur because, in general, there is no guarantee that 
such a search will always terminate for arbitrary terrain, targets 
and obstacles. Fortunately it is known that for a finite search 
area, depth first search will eventually terminate with either 
success or failure in searching for a specified goal [25]. 
Nevertheless, exhaustive testing for all possible terrain samples 
is not possible. Instead, the most that can be asked for is to 
show that all phase transitions in the given flow graph are 
correct [18]. 
It turns out that the inability to exhaustively prove 
correctness of a tactical-level flow graph is not as serious as it 
might at first appear. This is because tactical-level algorithm 
failure is no different than other outcomes that might cause a 
strategic-level goal to fail. Since strategic-level goal failure is 
accounted for in the overall mission-flow graph, the mission 
can still continue as planned. To make absolutely sure that such 
dependability occurs, a time-out condition resulting in goal 
failure must be incorporated at the tactical level [13]. 
Regardless, manual execution of progressively refined 
behaviors defined as flow graphs provides a mechanism for 
extending existing tactical-level behaviors.  That is, once a 
flow graph accomplishing a specific purpose (e.g., depth-first 
search) has been suitably vetted, it effectively becomes a 
trusted tactical-level behavior itself. This means reinterpreting 
tactical-level flow graphs as code specifications or templates 
rather than actual code to be executed [18]. 
V. VALIDATION OF RBM SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE THROUGH 
OPEN-OCEAN EXPERIMENTS 
A. Phoenix Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) 
Up to this point, presented results have related to the 
strategic level and the tactical level of RBM software for a 
single example of a “search and sample” mission for a notional 
UUV with results obtained through simulation. However, 
beginning in 1993, in parallel with formalization and 
publication of details of RBM [13], the value and practicality 
of this approach was demonstrated through a series of open-
ocean experiments involving two small unmanned submarines. 
The Phoenix AUV was an unmanned submarine designed 
and built at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) beginning in 
1990. Weighing approximately 500 pounds, Phoenix included 
four cross-body thrusters, enabling active control of five 
degrees of motion (x, y, z, pitch and yaw) [26]. 
Large numbers of high-fidelity physics-based simulations 
were needed to correctly develop and test what were then 
considered AI approaches to replace human supervision.  
While this simulation involved distinct mission phases in the 
form of a command “script”, similar to Fig. 1, no binary flow 
graph with phase failure contingencies was abstracted from 
these phases making exhaustive testing (and thus proof of 
correctness) of a mission impossible. Moreover, no concept of 
ethically constrained behavior was attempted in any of this 
work. 
B. Aries AUV 
Lessons learned from the Phoenix UUV were incorporated 
into the second-generation NPS UUV, the Aries.  Specifically 
designed for open-ocean surveys, Aries was a somewhat larger 
vehicle that utilized more efficient forward thrusters but lacked 
cross-body thrusters [20].  An extensive and accurate 
physically based model of the vehicle and its environment, 
with three-dimensional (3D) graphical display, the 
Autonomous Unmanned Vehicle (AUV) Workbench, was 
developed and used for real-time testing of robot mission 
software [9] [21] [27]. 
Aries AUV missions were defined with the NPS-developed 
Autonomous Vehicle Command Language (AVCL), a schema-
constrained XML data model supporting autonomous vehicle 
mission implementation, execution, and management [20].  
While the mathematical concept of an MEA had not been 
developed at the time of AVCL’s development, a fixed set of 
goal types is provided and branching upon goal completion is 
supported as well.  Thus, AVCL is suitable for the realization 
of mission flow diagrams.  Further, AVCL was intentionally 
designed to support implementation of RBM strategic and 
tactical levels and was utilized to define RBM-controlled Aries 
missions for AUV Workbench simulation and real-world open-
ocean tests. 
Simulation of a mission consisting of an AVCL 
specification for a search goal similar to Goal 1 of Fig. 5, while 
steering clear of avoidance areas specified as constraints in the 
AUV Workbench, is shown in Fig. 8.  During the mission, the 
tactical level plans a path and maneuvers to the search area 
Fig. 7.  Flow graph for a grid-based depth-first search of Area A developed 
through progressive refinement, adapted from [18]. 
while remaining clear of the avoid areas and then develops and 
executes a suitable pattern for the required area search.  More 
complicated missions demonstrating the binary branching 
model were conducted in AUV Workbench simulations and 
also in open-ocean experiments in Monterey Bay [20]. 
VI. MISSION SPECIFICATION VALIDATION 
A. Description Logics (DL) and a Robot Mission Ontology 
Thus far, this discussion has focused on providing robot 
operators the ability to rigorously define and test strategic-level 
missions.  The premises upon which this proposed framework 
for ethical robot tasking rests also require that an actual target 
vehicle can execute these missions without further translation.  
Fortunately, mathematical logic provides a mechanism for 
bridging strategic level missions and vehicle-specific code for 
specifying and ordering tactical-level behaviors. 
Description Logics (DL) are a mathematical family of 
logic-based knowledge representation systems for describing 
concepts and roles within a system.  DL ontologies can define 
the relationships in a system, how they operate, how they are 
used, and to what specific entities they apply.  DLs are 
carefully and strictly defined to enable computationally 
efficient reasoning that can identify hidden relationships and 
errors, such as rule violations or contradictions [28]. 
DLs provide the foundation of the Semantic Web, a set of 
standards-based extensions to the World Wide Web that 
leverage DLs’ expressiveness and rigor to provide extensive 
knowledge representation, discovery, and utilization 
capabilities [29].  Notably, the Web Ontology Language 
(OWL) [30] encodes a particularly powerful DL in a 
validatable plain-text computer-readable form [31].  OWL is 
used here to define a robot mission description and execution 
ontology that applies and enforces MEA semantics.  
B. Mission Execution Ontology (MEO) 
A Mission Execution Ontology (MEO) serves a number of 
purposes.  First, it enables a formal and semantically rich 
description of the characteristics of a MEA mission 
description.  For instance, OWL expressions are used to 
declare the existence of concepts such as “Mission”, “Goal”, 
and “Constraint” and also to define possible relationships 
between concepts.  As an example, a “Mission” entity must 
have an “includes” relationship with at least one “Goal” entity 
and must have a “startsWith” relationship with exactly one of 
those entities.  A partial graphical depiction of the concepts and 
relationships defined in the MEO is provided in Fig. 9. 
In addition to the concepts abstracted directly from 
mission-flow diagram semantics, the MEO introduces the 
“Vehicle” concept providing for the inclusion of specific target 
vehicles in the mission-planning process.  The “canExecute” 
and “canIdentify” relationships allow mission planners to 
explicitly assert that the intended target vehicle has a tactical-
level behavior capable of completing a goal and recognizing 
potential violation of a constraint, respectively.  Using this 
concept and relationship semantics enforced by MEO rules, it 
is impossible to define a valid mission that cannot be executed 
by the intended vehicle. 
Fig. 8.  A UUV mission defined using Autonomous Vehicle Command Language (AVCL) depicting simulated conduct of a 
goal-oriented mission with constraints [9]. 
In addition to describing the “Mission”, “Goal”, 
“Constraint”, and “Vehicle” concepts and how they relate to 
one another, the MEO allows the application of those concepts 
to real-world entities and the establishment of relationships 
among these entities.  This means that the atomic entities to 
which the “Goal” and “Constraint” concepts are applied will be 
executable by specific target vehicles.  The MEO can be 
applied to a snippet of vehicle-specific executable code by 
defining an OWL statement declaring its existence.  Additional 
OWL statements can then declaratively apply concepts and 
establish relationships.  Fig. 10 shows the mission of Fig. 5 
expressed using OWL according to the MEO of Fig. 9, 
produced from RDF/OWL source using the Protégé Ontology 
Editor [32].  Detailed comparison of Fig. 5 with Fig. 10 (which 
was automatically generated) shows that the intended mission 
has been correctly encoded, is validated, and is executable by 
the target vehicle.  Based on inspection of each figure, the 
human mission commander can confirm that all necessary 
ethical constraints have been applied in the correct contexts. 
The ability to provide a full description of all goals and 
constraints using vehicle-executable code further strengthens 
the MEA construct.  Specifically, not only is it impossible to 
define a mission for a particular vehicle without explicit 
“canExecute” relationships between the vehicle and all mission 
goals and “canIdentify” relationships between the vehicle and 
all mission constraints, but it is also impossible to assert these 
relationships without an appropriate vehicle-specific encoding 
of all mission goals and constraints. 
Automated reasoning is an important tool for ensuring 
strategic-level mission validity before conducting exhaustive 
testing described in previous sections.  If, for instance, a 
mission includes goals that are not executable by the target 
vehicle, a reasoner can quickly identify this shortcoming.  
Similarly a reasoner can detect mission flow-graph structural 
errors based on ontology rules, thereby precluding illogical 
loops, unreachable goals, and orphan goals without specified 
successors.  A reasoner can also simplify mission definition by 
detecting implicit relationships that are not explicitly specified. 
As described, a DL-based mission execution ontology 
defined in OWL ties MEA semantics discussed in previous 
sections to actual target vehicles.  The ontology ensures not 
only structural validity of a mission-flow graph, but also its 
executability on the target vehicle.  Thus, all of the 
requirements originally posed for assignment of human 
responsibility — that the mission is defined in a 
mathematically rigorous manner, that the mission is 
understandable by both the human operator and the target 
vehicle, and that the mission is comprised entirely of trusted 
vehicle behaviors — are captured in the human-approved 
mission orders and enforced by the strict semantics of the 
MEO. The ability to validate ethical correctness and 
completeness is an important new addition to cooperative 
mission definition and execution between humans and robots. 
Fig. 9.  A Mission Execution Ontology (MEO) is formally implemented using 
RDF/OWL describing the concepts, roles, and relationships associated 
with flow-diagram mission descriptions. 
Fig. 10.  OWL diagram of goals, relationships, and ethical constraints for Figure 5 mission as shown in Protégé Ontology Editor [32].
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Ethical operation of robotic systems requires human 
accountability.  In both the legal and moral sense, this implies 
that human operators be in a position to understand, and 
therefore control, robot mission outcomes. This level of 
understanding can be achieved through the satisfaction of three 
requirements:  operator understanding of high-level mission 
flow, mission descriptions understandable to both human 
operators and target vehicles, and mission descriptions 
consisting entirely of trusted behaviors and constraints. 
Early NPS UUV missions were executed as a result of an 
inferencing process over a mission definition comprised of a 
set of rules and facts. This approach provided no means of 
proving the correctness of strategic-level missions comparable 
to the exhaustive testing of MEA flow graphs.  For this type of 
system, errors in the mission axiom set can lead to 
unpredictable and potentially hazardous or self-defeating 
system execution behavior.  Ultimately, this unpredictability 
precludes the formal assumption of responsibility or liability 
for robot missions. 
Further, AI approaches in general almost invariably make 
use of easily confounded inferential reasoning or statistical 
pattern recognition. Applying such broad abstractions to the 
innumerable situations that can arise in the real world is 
inherently unpredictable, and also makes unrealistic any 
assumption of responsibility by human operators. It is therefore 
apparent that the abstract reasoning of general AI approaches is 
inappropriate, at least at the present time, for the highest level 
of robot mission definition and control. 
Algorithms cannot replace human responsibility.  Even so, 
a fully testable technology (such as that provided by the MEA 
and MEO formalisms) allows for the assignment of human 
accountability.  Specifically, the MEA provides a 
mathematically rigorous mechanism for mission definition and 
execution as an exhaustively testable flow diagram.  This 
approach ensures that accountable operators can fully 
understand all high-level task sequences before authorizing 
robot operations.  The MEO employs DLs and Semantic Web 
technologies to provide strong assurances that MEA mission 
definitions are semantically correct and fully executable by 
specific target vehicles. 
By applying the best strengths of human ethical 
responsibility, repeatable formal logic and directable 
unmanned systems together, these capabilities provide a 
practical framework for ethically grounded human supervision 
of unmanned systems. 
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